News Archives • Scheldrup Wiltfang Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C.

Legal Update: Temporary Work Offers and Benefits Eligibility in Iowa

Thu, 09 Apr 2026 14:45:01 GMT

In Iowa workers' compensation, the details of a job offer can determine benefit eligibility.

By: Thania Rios

On March 23, 2026, Interim Commissioner Grell issued his decision in Taylor v. Precision Drywall —a decision that hinges, in part, on the requirements that Iowa Code section 85.33(3)(b) imposes on employers extending offers of work to temporarily disabled employees. The outcome of Taylor is a useful reminder of why it is so important for employers to ensure that they fully comply with 85.33(3)(b). An employer may make a good-faith effort to offer a temporary work assignment to a disabled employee; however, if that offer does not contain everything that 85.33(3)(b) requires, an employee may still be entitled to temporary benefits despite the fact that she was offered and refused a suitable work assignment.

Whether or not an injured employee is eligible for TPD, TTD, or healing period benefits can hinge on whether a sufficient offer of temporary work was issued. According to Iowa Code section 85.33(3)(a),

[i]f an employee is temporarily, partially disabled and the employer for whom the employee was working at the time of the injury offers to the employee suitable work consistent with the employee’s disability the employee shall accept the suitable work, and be compensated with temporary partial benefits. If the employer offers the employee suitable work and the employee refuses to accept the suitable work offered by the employer, the employee shall not be compensated with temporary partial, temporary total, or healing period benefits during the time of refusal.

Since a temporary offer of suitable work has the potential to reduce an employer’s liability in the event of a refusal, it is in the best interests of many defendant-employers to extend such offers to their partially disabled employees. However, according to the plain text of 85.33(3)(b), offers of temporary work need to be formatted in a highly particular way. To meet the standard of a ‘suitable offer’ for purposes of Iowa Code Section 85.33(3)(a), offers of temporary work must:

Be in writing ,
Contained a job description detailed enough to clearly convey that the work being offered is suitable, given the employee’s temporary disability,
Include details of lodging, meals, and transportation, if applicable,
Explicitly state that, if the employee refuses the offer of temporary work, the employee must communicate both the refusal and the reason for the refusal to the employer in writing , and
Explicitly state, during the period of a refusal of temporary work, the employee will not be compensated with TPD, TTD, or healing period benefits , unless the work refused is not suitable.

In Taylor v. Precision Drywall , the defendant argued that the claimant was ineligible for healing period benefits given the fact that he refused a written offer of suitable work. Commissioner Grell, however, noted that the offer did not provide enough details about the job to make it clear whether it was suitable, did not communicate to the employee that he should communicate both his refusal and the reason for his refusal in writing, and did not communicate to the employee that he would not be compensated during the period of refusal. As such, he found that the defendants failed to comply with 85.33(3) and that the claimant was entitled to healing period benefits.

In light of Taylor v. Precision Drywall , employers should be very cautious about ensuring that their offers of temporary work align with the requirements of 85.33(3). Failing to do so could leave them liable for further benefit payments, even if the employee refuses the job.

Alternate Care in Iowa Workers’ Compensation: What It Takes to Succeed

Thu, 26 Mar 2026 15:20:48 GMT

Employees can request alternate care in Iowa workers’ compensation cases — but meeting the legal standard is often more difficult than expected.

By: Thania Rios

Under Iowa law, employers are required to provide injured employees with reasonable healthcare to treat their workplace injuries. Additionally, Iowa law grants employers the authority to select the physicians who provide that healthcare. However, under certain circumstances, employees can pick their own providers and at their employer’s expense. As explained in Iowa Code section 85.27,

If the employee has reason to be dissatisfied with the care offered, the employee should communicate the basis of such dissatisfaction to the employer, in writing if requested, following which the employer and the employee may agree to alternate care reasonably suited to treat the injury. If the employer and employee cannot agree on such alternate care, the commissioner may, upon application and reasonable proofs of the necessity therefor, allow and order other care.

However, any employee interested in seeking a provider of their own choosing should be aware of what it takes to prevail. In alternate care actions, claimants have the burden of proof of proving that the care provided by defendant-employer was unreasonable. Long v. Roberts Dairy Co. , 528 N.W.2d 122, 123 (Iowa 1997). To meet this burden of proof, “the claimant must show that the care was not offered promptly, was not reasonably suited to treat the injury, or that the care was unduly inconvenient for the claimant.” Id . at 122. As stated by the Supreme Court of Iowa, a “choice [of provider] does not become disagreeable just because the employee disagreed with it.” Harned v. Farmland Foods, Inc. , 331 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 1996).

Under Iowa law, determining what ‘reasonable’ means for purpose of Iowa Code section 85.27 is a question of fact to be decided by the assigned deputy. As Commissioner Grell articulated in Herrera de Gonzalez v. Seaboard Triumph Foods , “[r]easonable care includes care necessary to diagnose the condition.” Herrera de Gonzalez , File No. 19002660.01 ( Arb. 9/3/2020 ) at 4. Additionally, as the Supreme Court of Iowa stated in Pirelli-Armstrong Tire Co. v. Reynolds , “[w]hen evidence has been presented to the commissioner that the employer-authorized medical care has not been effective and that such care is ‘inferior or less extensive’ than other available care requested by the employee, the commissioner is justified by section 85.27 to order the alternate care.” Pirelli-Armstrong Tire Co. , 433, 437 (Iowa 1997).

When filing a petition for alternate care, claimants must be mindful to ensure that they offer proof that the care provided by their defendant-employer was not suitable to treat their injuries. Likewise, when confronted with an alternate care petition, defendant-employers should ensure that the employee communicated their dissatisfaction with their treatment in accordance with the requirements of Iowa Code section 85.27. In Iowa workers’ compensation cases, alternate care petitions usually fail due to a lack of communication or a lack of proof of the unreasonableness of the care.

Correct Use of the AMA Guides Determines Outcome in Brus v. Tyson Fresh Meats

Thu, 12 Mar 2026 16:29:56 GMT

By: Thania Rios

On 2/10/2026, the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commission issued a decision in Areli Brus v. Tyson Fresh Meats . Deputy Jennifer S. Gerrish-Lampe ruled in favor of the defendant, who was represented by Charles Showalter of Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C. In her decision, Deputy Gerrish-Lampe found that the strength of Claimant’s case was undermined by her independent medical exam, which incorrectly applied Table 6-9 of the AMA Guides, 5th Edition while assigning Claimant an impairment rating.

Ms. Brus, a Tyson employee, alleged that injuries sustained during a slip-and-fall at work resulted in an abdominal hernia. She underwent surgery with a mesh implant to repair the hernia, but still complained of pain afterwards and ultimately brought an action against Tyson. As part of her case, she underwent an IME with Dr. Sunil Bansal. Dr. Bansal assigned Ms. Brus a whole-body impairment rating of 9% based on the fact that she was still experiencing pain at her surgery site that “went beyond ‘occasional mild’.” Areli Brus v. Tyson Fresh Meats , File No. 22000220.02 (Arb. 2/10/2026) at 7.

Dr. Bansal’s assessment contradicted the conclusion reached by Defendant’s expert, Dr. Douglas Martin. Dr. Martin, a co-chair of the AMA Guides Editorial Panel, stated in his report that an impairment rating can only be assigned for a hernia if there is a “palpable defect in the supporting structures of the abdominal wall.” Id . at 8. Given that Ms. Brus underwent a successful mesh implant surgery, she suffered from no such defect in her abdominal wall—and, therefore, had no impairment attributable to her hernia.

The outcome in this case is another reminder of the importance of ensuring that IME providers utilize the Guides carefully and correctly. By her own admission, Deputy Gerrish-Lampe found portions of Dr. Bansal’s report persuasive. Id . Iowa law, however, requires deputies to assign impairment ratings in accordance with the Guides—and Dr. Martin was the only provider who did that correctly.

FCEs in Iowa Workers’ Compensation: What They Can — and Cannot — Prove

Thu, 26 Feb 2026 15:00:03 GMT

By: Thania Rios

Functional capacity evaluations (“FCE”) can be useful tools during workers’ compensation cases. However, it is important that all parties involved be acutely aware of their uses and limitations. An FCE is not equivalent to an independent medical examination (“IME”) or a report from a treating physician; it cannot provide an impairment rating. It can, however, resolve disputes between parties regarding a claimant’s employment prospects. When used wisely, a well-drafted FCE can shed an objective light on a claimant’s capacities and greatly assist deputies in weighing evidence.

An FCE is a report drafted by a qualified evaluator—who is, more often than not, a physical therapist—regarding a claimant’s physical abilities in a workplace setting. While preparing the report, the evaluator typically puts the claimant through a battery of tests that assess their ability to perform job-specific movements such as lifting, carrying, standing, sitting, reaching, and bending. After the tests have been conducted, the evaluator compares the results against standardized work classifications from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles: sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy work. Based upon the results, the evaluator will issue an opinion about the level of work that the claimant is capable of performing.

An FCE is most appropriate when a claimant has reached maximum medical improvement, but the parties disagree about the claimant’s future employment prospects or ability to perform certain jobs. In this situation, an FCE can offer an objective assessment of the claimant’s physical abilities. However, it is important to note that FCEs have a key limitation. An FCE alone, without any evidence from a physician, cannot establish the existence of a disability. The Agency “gives little weight to functional capacity evaluations by physical therapists that are not adopted by a licensed physician and conflict with activity restrictions imposed by licensed physicians.” Allen v. Annett Holdings, File No. 5024900 (App. July 28, 2011) at 9. As Deputy Walshire notes in his decision in Allen , “Such therapists simply lack the medical qualifications to make such medical assessments and causally relate their findings to a work injury.” Id.

While FCEs can be useful, parties to a case must make sure they are making appropriate use of them. If an FCE contradicts the medical evidence, it likely will not be given much weight by the fact finder; and if it is the only proof offered to substantiate a claimant’s alleged disability, their claim will likely not succeed.

More Claims, Broader Coverage: How Two Iowa Cases Reshaped the Second Injury Fund

Thu, 12 Feb 2026 20:37:41 GMT

Two recent Iowa Supreme Court decisions have dramatically expanded who qualifies for Second Injury Fund benefits.

The Second Injury Fund (“SIF”) has been a staple of Iowa workers’ compensation law for decades. Developed in the wake of World War II, it incentivized employers to hire disabled employees by limiting the amount of liability they would incur in the event that employee became injured at work. If an employee has a pre-existing disability that affects a scheduled body part—which, in Iowa, includes arms, hands, legs, feet, and eyes—and then suffers a work injury that combines with the first disability to create a greater level of impairment, the employer is only liable for the compensation attributable to the work injury itself. The SIF pays the additional compensation resulting from the combined disabilities.

Historically, Iowa courts held that a workplace accident had to result in a scheduled injury before the SIF would pay any additional compensation for a combined disability. If a workplace accident resulted in an unscheduled injury—which, in Iowa, is defined as an injury to a body part or organ other than those explicitly listed as scheduled—the SIF was not liable for any additional payments. Two recent cases, however, have resulted in significant changes to this framework—and have drastically increased the amount of claims that are eligible for reimbursement from the SIF.

In Delaney v. Second Injury Fund of Iowa , decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa on 5/10/2024, the Court held that an employee who sustained an injury to her vascular system was nonetheless potentially eligible for benefits from the SIF. Delaney , 6 N.W.3d 714, 719 (Iowa 2024). Injuries to the vascular system are considered unscheduled by the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commission; however, in this case, the injury to the vascular system was a lymphedema in the workers’ right leg. Id . at 718. Since the vascular system injury was localized to a scheduled body part, the Court held that it was sufficient to entitle the claimant to SIF benefits, specifically stating that “an injury to a bodily system may result only in localized loss to use of a scheduled member” and thus trigger eligibility for SIF benefits. Id . at 720. On 12/13/2024, the Court doubled down on this decision in Strable v. Second Injury Fund , specifically stating that the SIF’s liability depends on the specific parts of the body that are permanently injured in subsequent injuries—and not on “how they are compensated.” Strable , 14 N.W. 3d 742, 748.

As a result of this, the landscape of SIF liability looks very different in 2026. Now, any injury to an arm, hand, leg, eye, foot, or eye can trigger SIF liability if the injured employee has a qualifying pre-existing disability. Given the burden this could potentially impose upon the SIF, a state-run organization with limited funds, it is possible that future legislation could change this. For now, employees with pre-existing disabilities have more avenues to receive compensation for their injuries than ever before.

Understanding Workers’ Compensation in Iowa

Mon, 02 Feb 2026 16:00:02 GMT

What Workers’ Compensation Is Designed to Do

Workers’ compensation is a system created to provide benefits to employees who are injured while performing their job duties. In Iowa, this system is intended to offer medical care and wage replacement without requiring injured workers to prove fault.

At the same time, workers’ compensation limits an employer’s exposure to lawsuits by providing an exclusive remedy in most workplace injury situations. This balance is a key feature of the system.

Who Is Covered Under Iowa Workers’ Compensation Law

Most employees in Iowa are covered by workers’ compensation, regardless of whether the injury occurred suddenly or developed over time. Coverage generally applies when an injury arises out of and in the course of employment.

There are limited exceptions depending on the nature of the work and employment relationship. Understanding whether an injury qualifies often depends on specific facts and circumstances.

Types of Benefits Available

Workers’ compensation benefits in Iowa may include medical treatment related to the injury and partial wage replacement if the injury prevents an employee from working. In some cases, benefits may also address permanent impairment or long-term disability.

The type and duration of benefits depend on the nature of the injury and how it affects an employee’s ability to work.

Why Understanding the System Matters

Many injured workers are unfamiliar with workers’ compensation until an injury occurs. Misunderstanding how the system works can lead to missed deadlines or confusion about available benefits.

Learning the basics helps injured workers better navigate the process and set realistic expectations.

Final Thoughts

Workers’ compensation in Iowa is designed to provide support after a workplace injury, but the process can be complex. Understanding how the system works is an important first step for anyone dealing with a work-related injury.

This content is for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.

Shoulder Injuries Under Iowa Law

Thu, 29 Jan 2026 15:30:00 GMT

Shoulder injuries, and how they are compensated, have been a controversial issue in Iowa law since 2017. Before the 2017 changes to Chapter 85 of the Iowa Code, shoulder injuries were considered injuries to the body-as-a-whole, and compensable for up to 500 weeks under the industrial disability analysis. After the changes, however, shoulders were treated as scheduled injuries that were compensable for only 400 weeks. On its surface, this sounds like a straightforward change. The years since, however, have seen considerable debate regarding what the term “shoulder” even refers to and exactly how an injury to the region should be assessed and compensated.

Nowhere in the statute was the word “shoulder” defined. “Shoulder” was not defined in the AMA Guides , either, or used by doctors when assigning impairment ratings to the region. The term they used was “upper extremity,” which encompasses the entirety of the arm. Moreover, while authorities like Stedmans Medical Dictionary defined the shoulder joint narrowly as “a ball-and-socket synovial joint between the head of the humerus and the glenoid cavity of the scapula,” prior court rulings had decreed that the definition of shoulder also included the “tendons, ligaments, muscles, and articular surfaces connected to the glenohumeral joint.” Chavez v. MS Technology LLC , 972 N.W.2d 662, 667 (Iowa 2022).

The end result of this was an ambiguity about what an injury to the shoulder entailed—an ambiguity that claimant-side attorneys used to argue that injuries to the shoulder should be defined as injuries to the joint alone. In their decision in Chavez v. MS Technology LLC , the Supreme Court of Iowa resolved this ambiguity by deciding that the word “shoulder,” as used in Section 85.34(2)(n) “must be defined in the functional sense to include the glenohumeral joint as well as all of the muscles, tendons, and ligaments that are essential for the shoulder to function.” Id. at 668. This decision did a lot to clarify how cases involving shoulder claims would proceed in Iowa; however, some questions still remain.

Recently, plaintiff-side attorneys have begun arguing that upper extremity impairment ratings assigned to claimants with shoulder injuries should be multiplied by sixty percent in order to arrive at an impairment rating that applies exclusively to claimant’s shoulder. The rationale behind this theory is that it accounts for the shoulder joint’s involvement in the function of the upper extremity—which, according to the AMA Guides , is sixty percent. Whether or not this theory will prove successful in court remains to be seen. However, it has two significant hurdles to clear before it can become the law of the land: the fact that its rationale runs contrary to the Guides’ own directives for the issuance of impairment ratings, and the fact that this “weighting” has already been accounted for by the shoulder being worth 60% more than the upper extremity, as originally proposed in the 2017 amendments to the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Act.

Claims involving shoulder injuries are likely to remain sources of controversy, debate, and novel theories for years to come. Defendants should be careful to ensure that injuries to the shoulder are treated solely as scheduled injuries in accordance with 85.34(2)(n). Claimants, on the other hand, should be mindful to take advantage of any opportunities to expand shoulder claims into body-as-a-whole claims—all while remembering that injuries to the muscles, tendons, and ligaments attached to the glenohumeral joint will not be sufficient for this purpose.

Madrid. v. Tyson Fresh Meats

Thu, 08 Jan 2026 16:00:01 GMT

Without strong objective evidence, it is very possible for claims to fail.

On 9/15/2025, the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commission issued a decision in Omar Madrid v. Tyson Fresh Meats . Deputy Andrew M. Phillips ruled in favor of the defendant, who was represented by Jason Wiltfang of Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C. In his decision, Deputy Phillips found that the reliability of Mr. Madrid’s testimony was undermined by the lack of objective evidence to support his claims about his symptoms.

Mr. Madrid, a former Tyson employee, claimed that he injured his wrists while turning product—and that the resulting pain was so severe that it rendered him unable to work. However, as Deputy Phillips notes in his decision, “[w]hile the claimant subjectively believed that he could not work, there were several doctors who allowed him to return to work with no restrictions following his October 6, 2023, injury to his upper extremities.” Madrid , File No. 24002946.01 (Arb. 9/15/2025) at 22. Moreover, though Mr. Madrid “attempted to claim” that he voluntarily resigned his employment with Tyson “due to an inability to perform his job,” he “contradict his own testimony later in the hearing” by admitting that he left due to feeling disrespected by his supervisors, casting further doubt on his claims that he was unable to work. Id . at 23.

The claimant’s medical expert, Dr. Bansal, was the only physician who “came remotely close to recommending that Mr. Madrid not work.” Id. However, Deputy Phillips found that “Dr. Bansal’s opinions are significantly flawed, especially considering that he does not appear that he reviewed the records of [the] treating neurosurgeon.” Id. Deputy Phillips also observed that “Dr. Bansal’s report does not specifically explain how Mr. Madrid developed symptoms despite his not working for several months following his resignation from Tyson” and “Dr. Bansal’s opinions on the stresses caused by Mr. Madrid’s work at Tyson were based entirely upon Mr. Madrid’s descriptions, and not on a review of a job description from Tyson or any other objective piece of evidence.” Id . at 24.

As a result of these weaknesses in the claimant’s argument, Deputy Phillips found that “Mr. Madrid has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged injuries from October 6, 2023, were a cause of temporary disability during a period of recovery.” Id. at 23. The outcome of this case serves to prove a basic principle of litigating a worker’s compensation case: claims that are substantiated by objective evidence are more convincing than claims that are rooted solely in a party’s subjective recollections. Without strong objective evidence, it is very possible for claims to fail.

Marcum v. Westside Auto Pros

Thu, 04 Dec 2025 17:00:00 GMT

When testimony conflicts with the evidence, credibility becomes the deciding factor.

On 9/4/2025, the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commission issued a decision in Marcum v. Westside Auto Pros . Deputy Jennifer S. Gerrish-Lampe ruled in favor of the defendant, who was represented by Chris Scheldrup of Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C.

In her decision, Deputy Gerrish-Lampe found that Marcum’s lack of credibility undermined his efforts to prove that his symptoms were related to a workplace injury. Throughout the litigation process, the claimant—a truck driver who alleged that he injured his right shoulder, right arm, and neck after an accident at work—repeatedly offered inconsistent and contradictory testimony. This testimony, instead of bolstering his case, only served to discredit him.

The most significant inconsistency related to the cause of the claimant’s injuries. During the hearing, Marcum insisted that a workplace accident was the cause of the injuries he suffered on 1/4/2024. Marcum , File No. 24002769.01 (Arb. 9/4/2025) at 5. However, Marcum’s medical records stated that the cause of his injuries was a fall at home. Id . at 7. He was also inconsistent when it came to establishing the sequence of events on 1/4/2024, which further weakened his case. During the hearing, he claimed that he made a phone call to his supervisor after the accident. Id . at 5. However, the call log that he entered into evidence showed that, on the day of the accident, he actually made four phone calls to the phone number that he claimed belonged to his supervisor. Id. at 6. What’s more, the owner of Westside Auto Pros testified that the phone number in question wasn’t even the supervisors. Id . at 5.

Taken together, these inconsistencies made Marcum an unreliable witness in the eyes of the Deputy. As she herself noted, “[i]n a situation where there are two directly competing testimonies, a determination of credibility must be made and a specific finding of fact has to be established.” Id. at 7. Resolving “the inconsistencies in claimant’s favor” would have required finding that multiple witnesses were lying and that Marcum’s medical provider failed to accurately document his symptoms, a prospect that the Deputy found unreasonable. Id . In light of this, she deemed Marcum a “noncredible witness” and determined that he did not suffer a workplace injury. Id. at 14.

The ruling in Marcum makes it evident that inconsistent testimony has the potential to derail a case. Claimants should ensure that their testimony aligns with the available evidence; if they don’t, they may come across as untrustworthy to the finder of fact.

Irvin v. Tyson Fresh Meats

Thu, 20 Nov 2025 16:00:09 GMT

Accurate job descriptions remain essential evidence in cumulative injury claims.

On August 27, 2025, the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commission issued a decision in Irvin v. Tyson Fresh Meats. Deputy Amanda R. Rutherford ruled in favor of the defendant, who was represented by Jason Wiltfang of Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C. In her decision, Deputy Rutherford found that the evidence in the record was insufficient to establish that the claimant’s duties resulted in a cumulative injury.

While explaining the rationale behind her decision, the Deputy paid particular attention to the vague job description that Irvin provided to her medical expert. In the letter sent to her expert requesting an opinion and providing background information, Irvin included an excerpt from her Answers to Defendant’s Interrogatories that stated that, at work, “she made 500 to 1,000 boxes daily, as well as stacked boxes, moved boxes, and put them on the line, down chutes or on top units” and that “the job required repetitive lifting, bending, and twisting.” Irvin , File No. 23009752.01 (Arb. 1/31/2025) at 15. However, Irvin did not “provide pertinent details such as weighs, sizes, amount of force needed, and/or explain body mechanics that could have caused her alleged injuries.” Id . Deputy Rutherford stated that, because of this omission, the claimant’s expert was “not given an accurate, detailed and/or complete job description before authorizing his report.” Id .

The fact that the claimant’s expert based his examination on an incomplete job description ultimately proved fatal to Irvin’s case. As the Deputy noted in her decision, “[i]n a cumulative injury claim, a medically supported diagnosis, detailed and complete job description, and clearly articulated mechanism of injury are essential evidence.” Id. Without that evidence, it is very difficult for claimants to meet their burdens of proof.

The decision in Irvin goes to show that, when it comes to cumulative injury cases, experts should be provided with complete job descriptions—otherwise, the flawed foundation of the expert’s opinion can render it unpersuasive.

Caballero v. Tyson Fresh Meats

Fri, 24 Oct 2025 16:49:03 GMT

Credible, evidence-based testimony shapes Iowa causation rulings.

On May 16, 2025, the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commission issued a decision in Caballero v. Tyson Fresh Meats , File No 23005158.01 . Deputy Erin Q. Pals ruled in favor of the defendant, who was represented by Jason Wiltfang of Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C.

In her decision, Deputy Pals found that the claimant failed to prove that he sustained an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. This finding was shaped in large part by the disparity between the parties’ IMEs. The claimant’s expert’s opinions made broad “blanket statements” regarding causation that cited neither the medical record nor the AMA Guides , the Deputy found. The defense’s expert, on the other hand, related all of his opinions to the medical record and cited the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Disease and Injury Causation to further support his findings.

The approach employed by the claimant’s expert, Farid Manshadi, MD, failed to persuade the Deputy that the claimant’s employment caused his injury. Deputy Pals noted the paucity of claimant’s argument on several occasions, observing that claimant’s expert provided no rationale for his opinions despite being the only physician to relate the claimant’s injuries to his activities at Tyson.

When describing the importance of expert evidence to establishing causation, Deputy Pals noted that “[t]he weight to be given to an expert opinion is determined by the finder of fact and may be affected by the accuracy of the facts the expert relied upon as well as other surrounding circumstances.” Applying that standard to the facts of this case, Deputy Pals found “the blanket, cursory causation opinions of Dr. Manshadi” to be less persuasive than those of the defendant’s experts. This is a lesson that both claimants and defendants would do well to remember. The decision in Caballero is proof that an expert opinion, including the methodology applied and reasoning provided by the expert, has the potential to make or break a case.

Den Hartog Industries v. Dungan

Tue, 07 Oct 2025 22:09:36 GMT

Recent Iowa Supreme Court Ruling Alters Workers' Compensation Landscape

By: Thania Rios

On Friday, 10/3/2025, The Iowa Supreme Court issued an opinion in Den Hartog Industries v. Dungan that transforms how cases involving claimants who voluntarily leave their positions after returning to work are litigated. The case, which involved a claimant who quit his job after returning to work at a higher wage than he previously earned, required the Court to determine the correct interpretation of Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(v). Specifically, the Court was tasked with deciding whether claimants who quit after returning to work at wages equal to or higher than those they earned at the time of the accident should be compensated based on their functional impairment or their industrial disability ratings.

The Court used a plain-text reading to determine the meaning of the provision, deliberately eschewing the policy-driven interpretations that were utilized by the lower courts. Opining that the text of 85.34(2)(v) “isn’t ambiguous,” the Court found that the provision states that claimants who voluntarily leave their positions after returning to work for compensation that is equal to or greater than what they earned at the time of the accident are to be compensated based on functional impairment—not industrial disability. The Court also acknowledged that 85.34(2)(v) enables claimants who are terminated by their employers to pursue a second litigation process in which they can be compensated based on industrial disability. However, they affirmed that this right belongs solely to employees who are terminated, and not employees who voluntarily leave their positions.

It is worth noting that the facts of this case did not require the Court to address work that was merely offered (but not accepted) to a claimant at the same or greater wages, given that the claimant in this case returned to work after his injury. However, given the Court’s plain-text reading of the statutory language of section 85.34(2)(v), employees who are offered, but do not actually return to, work at the same or greater earnings may also be limited to the functional impairment rating instead of the industrial disability analysis. This issue will likely be addressed by the appeals courts in the future.

This ruling will have a significant impact on how both claimants and defendants will litigate workers’ compensation matters moving forward. Claimants will have to be aware of the impact that voluntarily quitting a position may have upon their case, while defendants must be mindful of the fact that any employees who quit after returning to work at equal or greater wages can be compensated based on the more favorable functional impairment rating.

Read the Ruling Here: Den Hartog Industries v. Dungan

John Cosgrove v. CRST Dedicated Services

Wed, 09 Dec 2020 20:22:00 GMT

In Cosgrove v. CRST Dedicated Services (File No. 5068073), a claimant sustained a scalp laceration after striking his head while docking his semi on 11/1/18. As a result of the incident, Claimant was transported to Waterbury (Connecticut) Hospital. While at Waterbury, Claimant underwent a battery of tests that were essentially non-remarkable with the exception of an electroencephalogram (EEG) which showed abnormal results due to mild generalized slowing; however, no seizure discharges were observed. Claimant was discharged from Waterbury on 11/3/18 and upon discharge was instructed to avoid heavy lifting and commercial driving. Claimant’s hospital discharge paperwork included an informational summary of transient ischemic attacks (TIA). After reviewing his discharge paperwork, including the TIA informational sheet, Claimant believed he sustained a TIA during the 11/1/18 incident based on the fact that the TIA document was included in his hospital discharge papers. However, Claimant admitted that a TIA diagnosis was never made at Waterbury or by any other medical provider. Claimant was released from care and placed at MMI on 11/15/18. Claimant was instructed to undergo a Department of Transportation “Return To Work” physical before returning to commercial driving to rule out any underlying non-work-related conditions.

After his release from care on 11/15/18, Claimant did not undergo the recommended DOT physical until 7/3/20 and instead indicated that he “wanted to go through the workers’ comp process before returning to work.” Claimant passed the DOT physical and was found qualified to operate a commercial vehicle though 7/3/22.

At hearing, Claimant argued he was entitled to healing period benefits from the date of injury until 4/2/20 – the date in which Claimant began the process of seeking clearance to return to commercial driving. In the decision, the deputy rejected Claimant’s argument and found that Claimant was entitled to healing period benefits from the date of injury until he was released and placed at MMI on 11/15/18. This amounted to 1.43 weeks of temporary total disability benefits.

Claimant also sought reimbursement of his IME report pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.39, or alternatively, as a hearing cost pursuant to 876 IAC 4.36(6). After finding that the defendant did not obtain an impairment rating, the deputy denied reimbursement under section 85.39.

In their post-hearing brief, defendant pointed out that Claimant did not so much as reference his IME report during hearing and therefore the request for reimbursement of the IME report under 876 IAC 4.36(6) should be denied. Ultimately, the deputy declined to award any hearing costs to Claimant, including Claimant’s request for reimbursement of his IME report.

Decision can be found at: http://decisions.iowaworkforce.org/2020/October/Cosgrove,%20John-5068073D.pdf

The post John Cosgrove v. CRST Dedicated Services appeared first on Scheldrup Wiltfang Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C. .

Naima Cerwick v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc.

Mon, 25 Feb 2019 19:30:00 GMT

The post Naima Cerwick v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. appeared first on Scheldrup Wiltfang Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C. .

James Hessenius vs. Great Plains Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc., and United First & Casualty Co.

Mon, 25 Feb 2019 19:29:00 GMT

The post James Hessenius vs. Great Plains Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc., and United First & Casualty Co. appeared first on Scheldrup Wiltfang Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C. .

News Archives • Scheldrup Wiltfang Corridorlaw Group Iowa, P.C.

Legal Update: Temporary Work Offers and Benefits Eligibility in Iowa

In Iowa workers' compensation, the details of a job offer can determine benefit eligibility.

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By: Thania Rios

Alternate Care in Iowa Workers’ Compensation: What It Takes to Succeed

Employees can request alternate care in Iowa workers’ compensation cases — but meeting the legal standard is often more difficult than expected.

By: Thania Rios

Correct Use of the AMA Guides Determines Outcome in Brus v. Tyson Fresh Meats

By: Thania Rios

FCEs in Iowa Workers’ Compensation: What They Can — and Cannot — Prove

By: Thania Rios

More Claims, Broader Coverage: How Two Iowa Cases Reshaped the Second Injury Fund

Two recent Iowa Supreme Court decisions have dramatically expanded who qualifies for Second Injury Fund benefits.

Understanding Workers’ Compensation in Iowa

What Workers’ Compensation Is Designed to Do

Who Is Covered Under Iowa Workers’ Compensation Law

Types of Benefits Available

Why Understanding the System Matters

Final Thoughts

Shoulder Injuries Under Iowa Law

Madrid. v. Tyson Fresh Meats

Without strong objective evidence, it is very possible for claims to fail.

Marcum v. Westside Auto Pros

When testimony conflicts with the evidence, credibility becomes the deciding factor.

Irvin v. Tyson Fresh Meats

Accurate job descriptions remain essential evidence in cumulative injury claims.

Caballero v. Tyson Fresh Meats

Credible, evidence-based testimony shapes Iowa causation rulings.

Den Hartog Industries v. Dungan

Recent Iowa Supreme Court Ruling Alters Workers' Compensation Landscape

By: Thania Rios

John Cosgrove v. CRST Dedicated Services

Naima Cerwick v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc.

James Hessenius vs. Great Plains Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc., and United First & Casualty Co.